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RULES AND NEGOTIATIONS: LIVESTOCK OWNERSHIP 
AMONG THE TURKANA IN NORTHWESTERN KENYA
Itaru OHTA
The Center for African Area Studies, Kyoto University
ABSTRACT  This paper examines how the Turkana follow (and do not follow) rules and 
norms in negotiations about their livestock entitlements. Previous studies on livestock owner-
ship in African pastoral societies tended to concentrate on the ideological and legal levels of 
property relations, namely, norms, rules and institutions. Although these rules and norms indi-
cate what actions are appropriate and desirable, people do not necessarily follow the rules and 
norms unconditionally, because they are effective only in specific contexts. The metaphor of 
“bundle of rights” has been utilized in the literature to describe how people have overlapping, 
complicated and multiple rights in livestock. However, the “bundle of rights” has been exam-
ined only on the ideological and normative levels. This paper demonstrates how the Turkana 
tenaciously negotiate in daily practice to persuade others of their legitimate entitlement to 
 livestock. Rules and norms are only evoked to assert the logic and explanation in these 
 negotiations. Likewise, the “bundle of rights” does not exist as a tangible, unchanging entity. It 
always emerges “performatively” in the process of a negotiation at a specific time and place. 
This author advocates the position that it is essential to thoroughly scrutinize the Turkana daily 
practice of negotiations in order to understand livestock property rights in the Turkana and 
other African pastoral societies.
Key Words: Property relation; Property right; Bundle of rights; Daily practice; Norm. 
INTRODUCTION 
Living among the Turkana, one gets a strange feeling of not knowing whether 
one’s own things really belong to oneself. My clothes, cap, wristwatch that I wore, 
the pots and tableware for daily use, the food kept in my hut, and other posses-
sions are all “owned by me,” which usually should be self-evident. And yet, I 
was often not sure, as if my surroundings were only a farce, and maybe the things 
that were “owned by me” did not exist at all. When such a doubt arose, I felt as 
if material things started to leach out of their outline as well as lose reality, seem-
ingly so ethereal, that I had vertigo, unsure of whether I was truly in this world 
or was having a dream.
I will try to elaborate with an example. The Turkana people come to me to ask 
many things from me. In doing so, their demeanor is absolutely proud and heavy-
handed, as if to say, “I am completely entitled to demand this from you.” This 
seemed quite coercive to the Japanese sensitivity. The Turkana would strongly 
demand to have things from me saying, “Why don’t you give me this? Am I a 
mere stranger to you?” The common sensical argument, that I am free to decide 
what I do with “my things,” does not go a long way (Ohta, 1986). I felt only 
irritation quite a few times in such situations. Itani (1982: 230) who researched 
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the same Turkana society later wrote that he “could not, to this day, understand 
the true nature of their relentless and never-ending begging.” Gulliver (1951: 8–9) 
also wrote, “my wife and I were continually pestered for all we had” while they 
conducted fieldwork, and “you must ask, nay demand, or else you will get noth-
ing” among the Turkana.
However, the longer I lived among the Turkana people, my feelings changed 
over time. This was partially due to my being able to retort, “I don’t have any!” 
even at times it was not true, as I learned to act in the Turkana way. It may have 
been a crude way for refusing a demand, but I had learned to say no. At the 
same time, I experienced myself demanding things from my Turkana friends, and 
at times, was given things where I was enticed into requesting by the owners! I 
started to suspect that there surely was an entitlement when the Turkana demanded 
my things or handled them as if they were theirs. Simply put, I had become 
accustomed to the Turkana way of life. However, here I need to point out that 
the helpless ambiguity that I described above, as to not knowing the reality of 
whether or not I really owned my things, came to me not before my accultura-
tion, but after it.
A simple explanation for the situation, “My things do not belong to me,” may 
be to say that in a society based on so-called “communal principles” such as the 
Turkana, the norm is to mutually share everything, and nothing may come under 
anyone’s exclusive entitlement. However, to state that, “In the so-and-so society, 
they behave this way because it is the norm,” is only convenient determinism, 
emphasizing the difference among cultures. I was more than aware of such deter-
minism from the beginning of my research living among the Turkana. I also knew 
that the argument was not at all effective in explaining the feeling of helpless 
ambiguity that I repeatedly felt.
Generally, social norms define the appropriate behavioral patterns of the mem-
bers of a particular group, and clarify the values to be achieved. At the same 
time, these norms (or rules) are utilized by the people to negotiate and fortify 
their demands, as Comaroff & Roberts (1981) demonstrated. Social norms and 
rules could simultaneously be adhered to and at the same time, be subject to nego-
tiation. In this sense, norms and rules are not at all absolute and exogenous to an 
individual, nor unequivocally definitive of behaviors that are “correct anywhere, 
anytime” (Ohta, 2001).
The Turkana are pastoralists living in the arid area of northwest Kenya. They 
keep five kinds of livestock: cattle, camel, goat, sheep, and donkey. Livestock is 
highly valued, and the Turkana collective noun for the above-mentioned livestock, 
ngi-bar-en (sing. e-bar-asit), is also translated as wealth. The Turkana verb, 
aki-bar which has the same stem, means “to multiply one’s livestock = to become 
rich,” and a noun, eka-bar-an (pl. ngika-bar-ak), signifies “the rich in livestock = 
a wealthy person.” I will not describe in detail here the importance of livestock 
among the Turkana, but a man without any livestock cannot marry, start a fam-
ily, maintain social relationships with friends, nor hold rituals to cure ailments. In 
other words, not only is livestock necessary to maintain a livelihood, it is also 
wealth of utmost importance in every facet of life, including social relations and 
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religion. The Turkana people are keenly interested in their livestock, and it is a 
source of conflicts of interest and emotional discords. This serves as the backdrop 
to the people’s social practice pertaining to livestock. Livestock ownership and 
entitlement, and the corollary issues, are central to the Turkana.
In the following pages, I elucidate how the Turkana follow (or do not follow) 
the norms that relate to the giving and receiving of things. For this, I describe 
their norms and daily practices pertaining to property relations of livestock.
PREVIOUS STUDIES ON PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PASTORAL SOCIETIES
I. Multiple Property Rights in Livestock
Kazanov & Schlee (2012: 7) in the introduction of Who Owns the Stock? 
Collective and Multiple Property Rights in Animals wrote that, the “most compli-
cated, multiple and overlapping rights in stocks are characteristic of African 
pastoralists.” They classified livestock property rights into the following five basic 
types:
(1) Full rights of ownership, which imply the ultimate right of allocation, 
 disposal and sale of animals.
(2) Nominal rights of ownership, where rights of control or even of 
 disposal belong to another person.
(3) Shared ownership (co-ownership, joint ownership) implies different degrees 
 of rights and even a different percentage of ownership in individual 
 animals.
(4) Usufruct rights, such as milking or transportation, which in many cases 
 are merely of a temporary order.
(5) The rights in the offspring or a defined part of the offspring of an 
 animal. Often calves are promised to hired shepherds for their services.
Kazanov & Schlee (2012) devoted five articles on African societies, all of which 
described and analysed complicated livestock rights. According to Pelican (2012: 
219), among the Fulbe (Mbororo) in northwestern Cameroon, sons were given 
livestock from their fathers, but the son had only “nominal ownership.” The son 
“cannot legitimately make use of his ownership rights,” before his father agrees 
that the son may build his own family based on his independent herd. Before this, 
the father has “the ultimate rights of allocation and alienation” of livestock. He 
may even sell his son’s animal. And although the father is “morally required to 
at least inform the latter and replace the animal as soon as possible, this obliga-
tion is often overlooked.” Women have “usufruct rights” to their own animals, but 
“the final right” lies with the household head. Schlee (2012: 260) also wrote that 
pastoral people had “shared rights” in an animal. For example, when an animal 
is given as a loan, both the holder and the owner have their own rights in the 
“shared” animal.
Although classifying the multiple rights that pertain to livestock into several 
categories seems useful in making the complicated livestock ownership more under-
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standable, this has a significant drawback in that it is easy to wrongly construe 
these rights as definite and legal. Pastoral people may declare, “I have full rights 
of ownership of this animal,” or “My wife has rights to utilize milk of this cow.” 
However, because these people do not have rules as codified law, such as ours, 
it is not always clear whether these statements imply rigid rules, or refer to moral 
requirements, or are mere descriptions of actual practice. There exist norms that 
are ethical, such as that, “Those living together must all share ample milk to drink, 
especially with the children when there is shortage.” There are also value-neutral 
rules, such as that, “An offspring of my livestock is mine.” Some norms may 
have a directly associated sanction in case of violation, but there are many others 
that do not.
II. Four Layers of Property Relations
Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006: 15) proposed that property should be analysed 
in the four layers: 
(1) Cultural ideals and ideologies, 
(2) Legal institutions,
(3) Actual social relationships, and
(4) Social practices.
Although what happens in each layer is closely related to the other layers, “They 
concern different kinds of social phenomena, just as marriage ideologies and legal 
rules about marriage are different from the actual relations between two married 
people and their daily interactions.”
Among the African pastoral societies, the above-mentioned first and second lay-
ers of ideologies and legal institutions are not significantly distinguishable. People 
have mutual consent in that there are proper ways of obtaining, utilizing and 
disposing livestock. Such consent may be called cultural ideology, belief, norm or 
rule, but because local rules and norms are not in the statutory form, it is diffi-
cult to discern ideologies and law.
Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006: 16) wrote that the second layer of legal institu-
tions provided a legitimate scheme for property relationships, where property rela-
tionships were “categorical,” because property holders, property objects, and rights 
and obligations attached to these were specific legal-institutional categories. It is 
evident that the Kazanov & Schlee (2012)’s classification of various rights to live-
stock into five basic types (categories) matches this layer.
Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006: 25) also lamented that many studies on property 
relationships failed to distinguish between the second (legal) and third (social rela-
tions) layers. At the third, social relations layer, property relationships are more 
“concretised” (Benda-Beckmann et al., 2006: 19), so that we may explore actual 
social relationships between property-right holders and certain valuables. Among 
the pastoral societies, property rights might be expressed in such a way as: “I am 
the owner of this camel,” or “I utilize the milk of this cow,” etc. These rights 
often become subject to negotiation, because people sometimes demand their own 
rights referring to diverse normative legitimations. People make various claims 
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and counterclaims on the contested livestock. Moreover, because people have many 
other social ties, such as kinship relations, wider social networks should also be 
taken into account in understanding the actual property relationships.
At the fourth, social practice layer, people use, transfer, and inherit property, or 
dispute the property rights. People might also discuss the appropriateness of prop-
erty rules, and rules and laws might be reproduced and changed in due course. 
These social practices will cause changes in the first, second and third layers of 
property relationships, which shows that these four layers are closely interrelated 
(Benda-Beckmann et al., 2006).
As I pointed out, previous research on property relationships of livestock in 
African pastoral societies have mainly focused on the second, legal-institutional 
layer. However, these studies contain many ethnographic descriptions of the third 
(social relations) and fourth (social practice) layers. For example, Schlee (2012: 
263) wrote in referring to Spencer’s (1973) research that livestock ownership was 
always contested and negotiated among the Samburu. A Samburu bridegroom must 
transfer eight cattle as bridewealth, but after marriage, the family members of the 
bride continue to demand gifts from the bridegroom and his patrilineal family 
members on various occasions. If the bride’s kin feel that their claims are not met 
reasonably, they may place a curse on the other party. Also, a Samburu man is 
not free to sell away his own livestock, because there is a moral obligation for 
the members of the same clan to assist each other in livestock transactions 
(Spencer, 1973 in Schlee, 2012: 263).
Dahl (1987: 260) explored women’s status and roles in pastoral societies. She 
proposed to classify property rights on livestock into the following three 
categories:
(1) “jural” rights to make final decisions of livestock disposal,
(2) “allotted rights” when specific animals are promised to be given in future, 
      at the time of inheritance or re-distribution, and 
(3) delegated rights to allocate and utilize livestock products.
She emphasized that although ideologies and cultural models in pastoral societ-
ies granted much authority to men whereas women were to be obedient to the 
men in behavioral norms, these norms belonged only to the sphere of idea and 
ideologies. She found that wives sometimes resisted suggestions from their hus-
bands and stuck to their convictions. The women’s informal influence played 
important roles in managing livestock herds and building/maintaining social rela-
tions. Dahl (1987)’s work also points out the importance of paying attention to 
the third (social relations) and fourth (social practice) layers of property relation-
ships above.
III. “Bundle of Rights”
When several persons have overlapping rights in an animal, their relationships 
may be analysed by utilizing the metaphor of “bundle of rights.” Baxter (1975: 
212) coined the term, “mobile” bundle of rights in the study of African pastoral 
societies. Pelican (2012: 213) also pointed out that the property rights are under-
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stood as a bundle of rights.
Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006) wrote that “bundle of rights metaphor” was effec-
tive in examining the property relationships in the second (social relations) and 
third (social practice) layers of analysis mentioned above. For example, a man 
may be the owner of a specific farm, but he may have conferred the right of its 
management to another person. The latter may have leased the farm to a tenant, 
who may have a share-cropping arrangement with several other persons. In this 
case, “sub-bundles” of property rights are widely borne among different actors and 
constitute the “bundle of rights” of the farm.
In this example, each actor’s property right in our society may be clearly defined, 
because each right is exclusively specified by the relevant laws. However, the 
same does not apply unconditionally in other societies, because people engage in 
variegated negotiations that each corresponds to a specific social context. As 
Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006) maintained, these negotiations occur in the third 
(social relations) layer of property relations, and they profoundly influence the 
emergence of the “bundle of rights” at each specific time.
Max Gluckman (1965a; 1965b) also utilized this metaphor of “a bundle (clus-
ter) of rights” in social anthropology. He argued that all property relations were 
ultimately social and political, and rejected the commonplace view in which prop-
erty was conceived in terms of the relationship of persons to things. A person’s 
right over a specific property is better understood by examining his/her relation-
ships with other persons. Gluckman (1965a: 36) wrote, “what is owned in fact is 
a claim to have power to do certain things with the land or property, to possess 
immunities against the encroachment of others on one’s rights in them, and to 
exercise certain privileges in respect of them.” Then, “ownership cannot be 
absolute, for the critical thing about property is the role that it plays in a nexus 
of specific relationships” (1965b: 45, italics for emphasis).
The “bundle of rights” does not exist as a tangible, unchanging entity. It always 
emerges “performatively”(1) in the process of a negotiation at a specific time and 
place, and it undergoes metamorphosis as members and their social relationships 
change among the parties concerned. In the following pages, I will demonstrate 
this point as seen in the process of negotiations by the Turkana over livestock 
ownership and usage.
IV. Turkana Statements
The Turkana frequently say, “Things are like this,” “Things should be done like 
this,” or “One ought to do this,” when they talk about livestock ownership. These 
remarks belong to the first (cultural ideals and ideologies) and second (legal insti-
tutions) layers of property relations (Benda-Beckman et al., 2006). However, because 
the Turkana do not have codified laws, it is insignificant to distinguish the two 
layers. The above remarks may be rules, norms and moral requirements, but I am 
not concerned with the distinctions of these remarks, and I will call them the 
Turkana Statements in the following sections of this article. Some of the Turkana 
Statements on property relations, such as, “An offspring of my livestock is mine,” 
115Rules and Negotiations: Livestock Ownership in Northwestern Kenya
are rarely uttered in daily life because it is a matter of course for them. Such 
Turkana Statements that are not uttered directly by the Turkana are nonetheless 
important, and will include my interpretation as well.
“IDENTIFICATION” WITH AN ANIMAL AT THE ONSET OF LIVESTOCK 
TRANSFER AND PROPERTY RIGHTS OF ADOLESCENT BOYS
I. Giving and Receiving Livestock through “Identification”
The Turkana castrate most of the male animals, leaving a few uncastrated for 
breeding. The Turkana men each choose an ox and nurture a special relationship 
with it. They modify the shape of the horns to their liking, decorate the body 
with necklaces, bells, and branding patterns. They also compose and sing songs 
about their ox, in which they refer to them using various metaphors. These songs 
are one of the most important venues for the Turkana aesthetic inspiration.
The Turkana possess quite a rich vocabulary for the livestock coat color-patterns 
and horn shapes (Ohta, 1987; Dioli, 2018). They use this colorful vocabulary, and 
a man is referred to as the “father of such and such ox.” In this way, one certain 
ox becomes the most important and special partner animal for the individual 
Turkana man. Castrated goats and camels are also identified and chosen as the 
special animal by the men. The Turkana verb, aki-dwar, means to keep a specific 
bonding relationship with a castrated animal.
This special relationship is called “identification” in social anthropology, and 
this custom with all its variations exists widely among the East African pastoral 
societies. The identified, special partner animal is alternatively called the favorite-
ox, name-ox, dance-ox, song-ox, etc. The reason as to why the chosen animal is 
a castrated one has been the subject of much sociological and psychological dis-
cussion (e.g. Beidelman, 1966).
The reason I touch upon this custom is because identification is among the 
motivations for giving and receiving livestock for the Turkana.
[Turkana Statement 1] 
The Turkana men ask for a specific animal among the livestock owned by oth-
ers, with the reason, “The animal has my own color-pattern,” and indeed are given 
the animal they want.
The expression, “The animal has my own color-pattern,” needs to be explained 
here. All Turkana men choose a specific livestock coat color as their own, and 
establish a special partner relationship with the animal of just the right coat color. 
However, each animal with such special bonding inevitably will grow much faster 
than each man, to grow old and die one day. Then another animal of the same 
coat color will be chosen, then another, again and again. Also, the Turkana man 
may “identify” not necessarily with one individual animal at a time, but rather, 
with a few, and all the animals have the same coat color.
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A Turkana boy of about five years of age will start to make and sing songs 
about a special partner ox of his own. In reality, the song is usually dedicated to 
a male newborn whose mother animal is either milked by the boy’s mother or 
the boy himself. When the boy becomes about ten years old, he may begin to 
own his partner animal of his chosen coat color, usually given to him by his close 
kin. He will then put necklaces and other ornaments on the animal, and sing songs 
about it in public.
II. Ownership as a Violable Right which Needs to Be Defended
However, this identification with an animal and the resultant ownership is sooner 
or later violated. After a boy starts his ownership of a special animal, it will grow 
with the boy, then be eaten by the family, exchanged with another animal, or sold 
off. The boy’s wish to keep his special animal is thus easily overridden.
Case 1 (27 December 1980)
The main characters and their relationships are: Kakuma, the homestead elder; 
Lokangai, the widow of Kakuma’s elder brother, who shares a homestead with 
Kakuma; Lopur, Lokangai’s first son about 15 years old; and castrated goats 
X, Y and Z. On this day, Kakuma slaughtered Z to be eaten by the homestead 
members. After the slaughter, I overheard quite an animated exchange from the 
direction of Lokangai’s hut. Lopur was shouting at his mother. The episode 
went as follows.
Lopur had “identified” with castrated goats X, Y and Z. He had thought of 
all three as his own. About one year ago, he had an agreement with Kakuma 
to exchange two of his castrated goats for an uncastrated young bull. At that 
point, Kakuma gained X and butchered it. The other castrated goat to be taken 
by Kakuma was not specified on the spot, but the agreement was to be made 
soon afterward. In other words, Lopur (or his mother Lokangai) owed Kakuma 
one castrated goat. Such an incomplete exchange often occurred between per-
sons in a close relationship. 
About three months after the agreement, Lokangai slaughtered Y for con-
sumption. Lopur believed that Y was taken as part of the original exchange 
promised with Kakuma. But this was not the case, and on this day Z was given 
to Kakuma to clear Lopur’s debt, and slaughtered.
Lopur was overheard shouting at his mother, “You killed Y without asking 
me first, but I accepted it because I thought it was the animal owed to Kakuma. 
I am not going to take this, if it was slaughtered just to be eaten by you. You 
ate Y without my permission. I demand that you repay me for Y.” To this, 
Lokangai retorted, “Some time ago, you broke one leg of my nanny goat while 
herding by throwing a stick at it. The animal died because of the broken leg. 
You repay me for that!” People who happen to be around imitated Lopur’s 
wailing and shouting, and laughed and laughed. Eventually Lopur himself started 
to laugh, and the quarrel did not become any more serious.
That night, I had Lokangai explain the incident. She said, “I was hungry, so 
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I ate Y. There is no reason a mother has to repay for eating her son’s goat!” 
She admitted that Y was “identified” by her son. She also admitted that she 
discussed with the homestead elder, Kakuma, about eating Y, and that she did 
not talk with her son, because he was not yet grown up. People who had gath-
ered around also emphasized to me that, “Lopur is not grown up.”
This incident shows that a boy’s “ownership” of an identified partner animal is 
at times easily ignored. That Lopur said he “thought” that Y was the animal owed 
to Kakuma, meaning that he did not know the real reason why he lost Y, goes 
against the Turkana way of thinking. I believe that he argued in such a way 
because the special animal was slaughtered against his wishes, and he needed to 
express his emotion that he was wronged. However, the boy’s resistance was to 
no avail.
There was another incident where another family was about to butcher a cas-
trated goat for a ritual, and the family head, about 30 years of age, asked his 
younger brother who was about Lopur’s age to give up his special partner ani-
mal. I happened to be at the scene, and saw the younger brother adamantly refused 
the request. The ritual had to do with the whole family and not of personal inter-
est to the elder brother. However, the younger brother refused to give up his goat, 
saying that it was his one and only special partner animal. Finally, the elder brother 
respected the wishes of his brother and slaughtered another goat for the occasion.
Why was the second boy’s resistance ultimately successful in contrast to Lopur’s 
situation in Case 1? Here I will not speculate on the difference in the background 
situations, but it is apparent that a boy must reasonably argue well to defend his 
ownership of a special animal. It was pertinent that he could persuade the people 
around him, and this point cannot be over- emphasized.
THE MATURING SON AND CONFLICT ABOUT LIVESTOCK
I. A Mother’s Livestock Is the Son’s as Well: The Son Takes Action
I have shown that a boy’s ownership of livestock is easily negated, but the boy 
will more strongly defend his wishes as he grows up. To describe this process, I 
also explain how livestock is “owned” in a Turkana family. A family has several 
levels of closeness in kinship ties (Gulliver, 1955). Here I will call a “family,” 
the group members who share a patrilineal tie and together manage their livestock 
herds. 
[Turkana Statement 2]
All the livestock of a family belong to the family head.
[Turkana Statement 3]
Most of the family herd is allocated to the wives of the family head.
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Looking at a livestock herd, if one asks, “Who owns these animals?” the 
Turkana people will reply first with the name of the family head, usually an elderly 
male. However, livestock basically “belongs” to the wife. If there is more than 
one wife, the livestock is distributed among the wives. A son inherits his mother’s 
livestock. This is to say, roughly speaking, a mother’s livestock is also the son’s, 
and the reverse is true as well. I was fortunate to witness how the relationship 
between mother and son in Case 1 changed over the years as the son grew up. 
The next episode took place eight years later, symbolizing the change in mother-
and-son relationship.
Case 2 (11 September 1988)
About 2 o’clock in the afternoon, I overheard Lokangai’s shrill cry in disbe-
lief, “What has this come to!?” I overheard the voice first near Lokangai’s hut, 
then heard it farther and farther away, and finally out of the homestead. I asked 
the people around me what had happened. They said that her son, Lopur, slaugh-
tered a nanny goat he was grazing in order to entertain the mother’s brother 
of his lover and eat its meat. The nanny goat that Lopur slaughtered had been 
given to Lokangai as her share of bridewealth when her daughter (Lopur’s 
sister) married. It belonged to Lokangai, but Lopur slaughtered this animal 
without telling his mother. Lokangai returned to the village after about thirty 
minutes. She kept wailing as if she did not know whom to direct her frustra-
tion. She even started to say, “I am going to eat Lopur’s special he-goat!” to 
which everyone tried to persuade her not to.
This incident was soon forgotten, seemingly without any lingering ill feeling. 
However, I think it was a special incident that showed a gravely altered mother-
and-son relationship. I had observed the way the family utilized its livestock from 
1980, and knew that this was the first time Lopur had killed an animal without 
his mother’s consent.
II. Continuous Conflict between Mother and Son: Gradual Accretion of a Maturing 
Son’s Claim
The above episode signifies the fact that Lopur’s social relations expanded to 
outside his immediate family. He had gained a lover, and for the Turkana youth 
in this situation, he must be always on guard to avoid getting into violent con-
flicts with his lover’s family members, at the least, but the lover’s kin would also 
come to demand many things from him. In 1991, Lopur killed another goat for 
the lover, then another for one of her kin.
Adolescence also coincides with the youth being demanded of things by the 
neighborhood elders and youths roughly of the same age. He will be repeatedly 
demanded to let them eat one of his goats. To meet these demands, Lopur killed 
at least nine goats between 1989 and 1992. A Turkana youth not only has to offer 
goats to these people, but he himself must go and demand livestock from kin and 
friends, because only through these negotiations, can a youth expands his social 
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horizons.
Around this same period, a youth will start to be recognized as an “owner” of 
livestock. In my research, I took pictures of livestock, one by one, owned by 
Lokangai and Lopur, and pasted them onto individual filing cards. When Turkana 
villagers visited me, they enjoyed fumbling through and sorting the cards over a 
conversation, saying, “This goat belongs to Lokangai. It was given to her from 
so and so.” In such conversations, all the livestock of Lokangai (and Lopur) were 
mentioned as Lokangai’s before 1982, and only one “identified” animal was Lopur’s. 
By 1988, however, the villagers that visited me referred to all these livestock as 
belonging to Lopur.
A youth gradually gains many entitlements to the livestock that his mother owns. 
There is no clear demarcation of when the mother gives up her formerly strong 
ownership or her say over the animals. It is also true that the interest of the 
mother and son do not always match. Lokangai became a widow in the late 1960s 
and managed livestock by herself. From her standpoint, she owned the nanny goat 
killed by her son, Lopur, in Case 2, as she had gained it as bridewealth of her 
daughter. Her livestock was to have increased as the nanny goat reproduced, so 
that in her mind, it was not right for her son to kill that animal. To her, Lopur 
could have killed his own castrated goat or asked his friends to give him a goat 
for the occasion. When Lokangai threatened Lopur “to eat his special he-goat,” it 
amounted to saying, “Only the animals Lopur ‘identified’ with were his entitle-
ment and no other. All else are mine.” In other words, Lokangai would not give 
up her entitlement. It was foreseeable that the mother and son would continue to 
have such conflicts as to who can do what with the livestock. Each would have 
to persuade the other as to the entitlement each time.
LIVESTOCK ENTITLEMENT DOES NOT BELONG TO AN INDIVIDUAL, 
AND NEGOTIATION ENSUES
I. Livestock Shall Belong to the Wife, and the Husband Cannot Dispense It Freely
While livestock is a potential source of conflict and tension between a mother 
and son, similar issues arise between a husband and wife, as well as a father and 
son. I must first explain the Turkana relationship among co-wives, and revisit the 
Turkana Statements 2 and 3: All the livestock owned by a family nominally belong 
to the family head, while they actually belong to his wives in daily practice. This 
rule is easily understood if one understands the following.
There is frequent giving and receiving of livestock among Turkana friends and 
kin. Here we assume that a friend of the husband gives him one animal. When 
the former owner comes to visit, who else offers a warm welcome to him/her, 
but the wife? Then, if the recently acquired livestock does not belong to a spe-
cific wife, no one is sure who should show hospitality to the generous gift-giver. 
Especially when there are co-wives, the ambiguity is insurmountable, but to avoid 
this uncertainty, each wife will do her best to assume the ownership of a gift ani-
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mal that the husband gained, which means that she will share the entitlement/
obligation that arises from the acquisition of the animal.
In reality, social relationships are even more complex. The friend, the husband, 
and his co-wives, have reciprocal relationships each built upon a long history of 
successive giving-and-taking, and it may happen that all the co-wives rush to wel-
come the visiting friend with fresh livestock milk. Even so, the ownership of the 
newly acquired livestock will not stay in limbo for long. This is because when a 
wife milks, slaughters, or sells livestock for cash, she utilizes her own livestock, 
and the affiliation of the crux of a wife’s daily living cannot rest unsettled for 
long.
Below is a case that convinced me personally that livestock belonged to the 
wives.
Case 3 (21 December 1982)
One day, when I returned from a 4-day walking trip, I slaughtered one cas-
trated goat for meat in order to express my gratitude to the villagers who 
accompanied me. A friend had given me the goat and I had entrusted it to the 
family that I stayed with.
The next day, the first wife of my host family came to visit, sat down next 
to me and started to complain. She said, “You are so different these days. You 
don’t talk to me, nor give me things as you used to. You only give me the 
same amount of tobacco as you give anybody else.”
I did not understand why she said these things all of a sudden. I told her 
that nothing between she and I had changed. She repeated the same comments 
for a while, and then brought up the subject of the goat I slaughtered the day 
before. She said, “It is not bad that you slaughter a goat when there are visi-
tors or when you are hungry, but you must first consult me. If you did, I could 
have told you to slaughter another animal, and given you one of my own. It 
is not good that you decide all by yourself.”
I suddenly understood. This woman had made sure to care for all the livestock 
that I bought or was given. When I acquired a nanny goat, she had asked me, 
“Who will milk this goat in future? Is it all right it is me?” as if she needed 
much assurance. There were other adult women in the host family, and what she 
wanted was to create a relationship with me where all my livestock “belonged” 
to her, and not to other women. Once such a relationship is made, neither party 
was to dispose of the livestock freely.
Such entitlement sharing involves all members of a family, with different degrees 
of entitlement from member to member. The next statement signifies the Turkana 
thinking that all the members of a family are inseparable as to livestock entitle-
ment.
[Turkana Statement 4]
All livestock acquired outside of the family must first be brought home to the 
livestock enclosure.
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If a man receives an animal from a friend and sells it before reaching home 
without consulting anyone, the fact that he had newly acquired livestock would 
disappear, as it were. From the standpoint of his family members, they had been 
denied whatever entitlement that could have arisen. Had the husband brought home 
the animal, they would all have gained entitlement, be it to eat the meat of the 
animal, or to acquiesce to it being given away to a friend. The latter is an 
entitlement, as the friend will owe the family members a new acquisition of an 
animal. It also follows that no family member is responsible for the livestock that 
they did not know of in the first place. So, if the animal is sold away before it 
is taken home, the fact that a friend gave an animal to the man would not have 
made any social meaning. In other words, livestock entitlement unifies the mem-
bers of a family as well as the society.
II. The Husband Has Discretion, but Wives Resist It
There are some situations where the husband’s discretion is recognized in deal-
ing with the livestock without first consulting the wife.
[Turkana Statement 5] 
When the husband gives away livestock that are called ngibaren a akib (live-
stock of akib)(2) he does not need to tell the wife beforehand. Akib livestock are 
all goats and sheep. In contrast, there are livestock called ngibaren a awi, where 
awi denotes the family. These animals are not under the husband’s discretion.
In practice, the matter is not so simple. The husband cannot freely do as he 
pleases with the akib livestock, even if he need not tell the wife beforehand. The 
following episode illustrates the complexity of the rule.
Case 4 (23 November 1980)
There was a time when I often bought the locally caught wild francolins 
(several species of wild bird which belong to the genus Francolinus) from the 
villagers, and quite enjoyed them for supper. But even though barbequed fran-
colins were my delight, I could not monopolize the dish if I was to follow the 
Turkana way, and had to share them with my friends. On the day I learned of 
the category of possessions called ngibaren a akib, I believed that one could 
“do as one pleases” to things in this category. So I cried out at supper that 
day, “These francolins are my akib, and I am eating them all by myself!”
My Turkana friends first looked perplexed, but then a young man said, “Ohta, 
your akib are your cash, tobacco, and the local brew kept in your hut. You 
don’t need to tell us when you wish to give them away. But food is not akib. 
The akib livestock is also called ngibaren a alakara (livestock of joy). This is 
because they are to be given away for the other people’s enjoyment. If you are 
not sharing the francolins with us, whom do you have in mind to give them?” 
The young man then added, “I don’t have akib livestock, because I am not 
married. Are you married?”
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Akib is contrasted with awi, the family. The Turkana logic is that only a mar-
ried man with his own family (awi) possesses akib livestock as well. Another 
time, the villagers explained to me that the category of akib livestock distinguished 
the husband’s livestock from the wife’s. That is, akib livestock are all goats and 
sheep that the husband acquired from the outside world as gifts and bridewealth, 
excluding the livestock that the wife acquired herself as bridewealth and gifts.
The husband may seem to have more discretion over livestock than the wives. 
But as Case 3 shows, the husband must be always on guard that the wives may 
resist his discretion, because in reality, all livestock belong to wives. Even with 
akib livestock, a wife has entitlements. The episode below illustrates this point 
clearly.
Case 5 (15 June 1991)
A man in his late 50s had two wives. He had a daughter between him and 
his first wife, who was soon marrying, and bridewealth negotiations had just 
started with the groom’s kin on how much livestock was to be transferred. He 
and his two wives each would get his/her own share of bridewealth, and he 
should allocate his own share to his wives. So how would he distribute the 
livestock to his two wives? One young man who was a neighbour of the bride’s 
family explained to me what he thought would happen:
“The father of the bride will probably allocate more animals to the second 
wife than the first wife. The first wife has a son about thirty years of age and 
fully grown. If the father distributes many animals to the first wife, not only 
she will have entitlements to the livestock, but her son as well. The mother’s 
livestock are at the same time the son’s. The son will multiply the livestock 
originally kept by the mother. When the bride’s father wants to utilize the live-
stock of his first wife, whether giving them away to his friends or selling them, 
the son of the first wife will variously refute the decisions. When the son is 
fully grown, he can argue strongly against his father, and the interests of father 
and son will not always match. No father likes such conflict. Therefore, the 
father will try to allocate many animals to the second wife who is still young, 
in order to exert stronger discretionary power when he wishes to utilize the 
animals. If the first wife complains about the allocation, he can point out that 
she has already gained many animals as her own share of bridewealth.”
The young man who explained this to me used the expression ngibaren a akib 
for the livestock that the bride’s father is to acquire as his share of bridewealth. 
But it was clear that the father could not have any monopolistic entitlement to 
the newly gained animals. It was also true that even if this father avoided con-
flict with the first wife and her son by allocating much livestock to the second 
wife, the second wife will argue for her own entitlements once the livestock is 
allocated to her. This is natural, since the second wife must care for the new ani-
mals, milking them, giving them water, and keeping them healthy.
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III. Negotiating Livestock Entitlement Utilizing the “Piece-in-Hand”
The husband may be able to defend his discretion over dispensing with akib 
livestock. However, the livestock of this category does not fall under his complete 
discretion as an absolute rule that everybody acquiesces to. The husband is sur-
rounded by people who may claim entitlements to his akib livestock at any time. 
Nor can the wife dispose of her livestock freely even if they were gained as 
bridewealth or gift to her. The extent of one’s entitlement cannot be generalized 
by statuses such as being a husband and being a wife. No specific livestock comes 
with a fixed entitlement where one can say, “Because I acquired the livestock 
through such and such a history, I have A, B, and C entitlements.”
The Turkana make the livestock all “belong” to specific persons by applying 
the category of akib livestock and “allocating” animals to wives in a family. How-
ever, when the livestock has to be dispensed for a specific purpose, each person 
must stand up face-to-face against the refusal of others to acquiesce to a transac-
tion, and argue for one’s own legitimacy. There is no knowing the outcome of 
the standoff, so therefore, entitlements to livestock are always situational and in 
flux.
Such circumstances are basically the same even outside the family. For exam-
ple, young Lopur had to slaughter many goats to appease the neighbourhood men 
and the kin of his lover who demanded to eat “his” goats. The demand was 
deemed to have certain legitimacy, and this was why Lopur offered his goats. 
Also, Lopur himself had been given livestock from kin and friends. Such gift 
giving took place because people recognized that Lopur had his entitlements. How-
ever, among the Turkana, persons who demand to eat or be given animals must 
first argue for his/her legitimacy, and the persons who are made such demands 
will only be able to refuse the demand by cleverly arguing and persuading 
otherwise. This negotiation is not at all different from those that occur within a 
family.
The Turkana are faced with constant negotiations, and they all persuade the 
other as to their legitimate entitlement. Let’s call a “piece-in-hand” the logic and 
explanation that people use for this purpose. For example, when a boy’s entitle-
ment was not respected, the boy may use this incident as his “piece-in-hand” next 
time, saying that he deferred last time. Lopur in Case 1 brought up a past epi-
sode that his mother slaughtered his identified animal without first telling him, to 
which his mother retorted by bringing up yet another past incident of her nanny 
goat dying because of Lopur. Likewise, if a husband gave away one of his 
livestock to his friend against his wife’s wishes, the wife will use the incident as 
her “piece-in-hand” in her next negotiation. This is the Turkana way of how the 
outcome of one negotiation will become the “piece-in-hand” tool for the next 
negotiation. The chain of negotiations continues forever.
In Turkana society, norms truly exist, and it is possible for them to utilize the 
norms shown above as Turkana Statements to buttress the legitimacy of their argu-
ments. The important point is that the norms and rules of the Turkana are neither 
absolute nor omnipotent in persuading the other. Kitamura (1991: 146) who stud-
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ied the same Turkana society wrote that the Turkana in their social interactions 
do not “refer to certain absolute standards,” nor “make agreements utilizing them 
as the basis.” This is true for entitlement negotiations over livestock. In Turkana, 
norms and rules are presented according to situations, as “piece-in-hand” for the 
specific negotiation, but never applied universally to all situations. In this sense, 
when the Turkana refer to the norms and rules, it is on a level with arguing an 
individual fact, such as, “I deferred to you in the past,” or, “I have only one goat 
so I cannot give it to you.”
Generally speaking, to say “such and such happened some time ago,” can be 
a statement of a fact to everybody, and rules and norms, “in such and such 
situation one should do A, B, and C,” may be applied to all parties involved. 
However, when the Turkana negotiate entitlements pertaining to livestock, such 
facts and norms do not apply unconditionally. They use various norms (cf. above 
Turkana Statements) and facts as their “piece-in-hand,” combine them freely to 
take control of the negotiation and persuade the other. They repeatedly redefine 
the issue at hand and how they will be judged. This is the process that the inter-
ested parties of the negotiation each create “the truth” of a specific time frame to 
make the other recognize one’s legitimacy.(3)
When the Turkana negotiate over his/her entitlement to a specific livestock, the 
situation is always unique. This is one and the same with the Turkana attitude 
that they never trust general and universal rules at any time. Each Turkana pos-
sesses a multitude of his/her own historical processes leading up to the specific 
time frame of the negotiation.
RECONSTRUCTION OF LIVESTOCK ENTITLEMENT
I. Inconsistency in Livestock Ownership
I have been truly struck by how the Turkana have keen and minute memories 
of every single incident that occurred to their livestock. For example, I identified 
in my research all the individuals of livestock held by several families, dividing 
them into matrilineal pedigrees. After many years, the villagers remembered in 
detail the pedigrees and current events of the livestock I had recorded. The 
Turkana use livestock for exchange and as gifts as the medium for creating and 
maintaining social relations. There exist specific animals at each and every turn-
ing point of social relations, and livestock transfers remain in people’s memory. 
Only when the livestock that go through transfer are remembered as specific and 
existing individuals, does history become explicit and established. I am always 
struck by how much the Turkana remember in detail.
Here I will present an example of how the Turkana go back in time to exam-
ine the pedigrees of their livestock, and reconstruct ownership. First one needs to 
be familiarized with the following two Turkana Statements.
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[Turkana Statement 6]
The livestock gained through exchanging animal-X belongs to the person who 
owned X.
[Turkana Statement 7]
The offspring of a female animal belongs to the owner of the mater animal. In 
other words, the owner of livestock belonging to a matrilineal pedigree is the one 
and same person unless there is a special exchange or gift giving.
 
Nanam and Mogira were half-brothers. Their parents had passed away, and 
Nanam was older, about 40 years of age in 1990, and was the first wife’s eldest 
son. Mogira was the eldest son of the second wife. Because each of these 
brothers inherited livestock from their own mothers, they held their own livestock 
separately. But they continued to live together, and I researched livestock of this 
family. Along the way, I encountered cases where the above Turkana Statement 6 
could not apply.
Case 6 (15 June 1991)
The brothers gave four heads of goat and sheep to the brother of Nanam’s 
mother around 1990. For this, they received a heifer. In 1988, two (X and Y) 
of the four livestock the brothers gave away had been kept by Nanam, and two 
(Z) by Mogira (Table 1, 1988). If such was the case, to whom did the newly 
acquired heifer belong? Would the brothers “co-own” the animal?
Table 1. Inconsistency in claimed livestock ownership between Brothers Nanam and Mogira in 
1988 and 1991.
Livestock
Ownership Explanation for why the owner 
seemingly switched1988 1991
X: one castrated goat Nanam Mogira Mogira “identified” with X
Y: one nulliparous sheep Nanam Mogira Originally belonged to Mogira
Z: two castrated sheep Mogira Mogira
Nanam and Mogira gained a heifer in exchange for X, Y and Z.
Their explanation in 1991 to my question was seemingly clear-cut (Table 1). 
They said that all four goats and sheep given away for the exchange belonged to 
Mogira, so it followed that the heifer was Mogira’s as well. The castrated goat-
X in Table 1 was originally Nanam’s. It was given to Mogira, because of his 
identification. Indeed, X had Mogira’s coat color. I must have missed hearing of 
this transfer in my 1988 research.
The case of the nulliparous sheep-Y in Table 1 needed a more detailed expla-
nation. The founder of the pedigree to which Y belonged to was gained in exchange 
for a castrated goat-V. The owner of the pedigree to which this goat-V belonged 
to was Mogira, but the goat-V itself was given to Nanam because it had Nanam’s 
coat color and he identified with it. However, when goat-V was exchanged with 
a female sheep, the founder of Y’s pedigree, this sheep belonged to Mogira, 
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because goat-V was originally owned by Mogira. Therefore sheep-Y also belonged 
to Mogira, according to the brothers’ explanation.
II. Gift and Lease of Livestock
The above case where a castrated goat-V was given to the elder brother by a 
younger brother due to identification may also be understood in light of the fol-
lowing Turkana Statement.
[Turkana Statement 8]
There are two Turkana words for the verb, “to give (away).”
(A) Ainakin: “to give (away)” in general, which can also denote “to lend.”
(B) Amekin: “to give away livestock.”
The people differentiate the two verbs as follows. Broadly speaking, each female 
livestock’s milk is a family member’s entitlement within a Turkana family. If 
female animals of one person no longer produces milk whereas someone else has 
many females that do, the former who needs milk may ask the latter for a lactat-
ing animal. If the family member who is asking for a lactating animal uses verb 
(A), it means that the livestock transfer is temporary. If the request is made with 
the other verb (B), the livestock transfer denotes ownership transfer as well.
In simplified definitions, the use of verb (A) involves a usufruct right, while 
the use of verb (B) involves the ownership itself. The Turkana vocabulary lacks 
the verbs, to lend and borrow, but in the following passage, I shall use the word, 
lend, to denote the concession of usufruct right.
Another situation that is similar to lending livestock occurs with an identifica-
tion of a special partner animal. For example, when I purchased a billy goat, a 
Turkana man approached me and said, “This animal has my coat color. Will you 
give it to me?” My young research assistant who overheard this warned me that, 
“The man used the verb, amekin (B), not ainakin (A), so if you consent, you will 
lose your goat.” This succinctly shows how the two verbs are differentiated by 
the Turkana, i.e. one can lend (= ainakin) livestock due to another’s identification, 
and not completely give it away. Then the seeming inconsistency in Table 1 
resolves, because when Nanam identified with Mogira’s castrated goat-V, Mogira 
lent him the goat. This is probably why the female sheep, the founder of sheep-
Y’s pedigree, gained through a subsequent exchange became Mogira’s.
However, there are still some unexplained points to this interpretation. First, if 
Nanam’s identified goat-V was lent from Mogira, and the female sheep gained in 
a subsequent exchange also belonged to Mogira, why did Mogira tell me in 1988 
that sheep-Y’s entire pedigree belonged to Nanam? What the brothers told me was 
inconsistent.
When I compared my research notes on livestock ownership by the brothers 
from 1988 and 1991, the claimed owners of four sheep pedigrees including that 
of sheep-Y had switched (Table 2). Each of the founder sheep of these four 
pedigrees was gained by an exchange with a he-goat. All four he-goats were orig-
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inally owned by Mogira, but all had been given to Nanam due to identification. 
In 1988, two pedigrees of sheep (A and B in Table 2) belonged to Nanam, and 
the remaining two pedigrees (C and D in Table 2) belonged to Mogira. If the 
Turkana Statement 8 applied, the he-goat used to gain sheep that mothered pedi-
gree C and D must have been only lent to Nanam. But in 1991, the ownerships 
had switched, and Nanam owned pedigrees C and D, while Mogira owned 
pedigrees A and B. Had the brothers strictly followed Turkana Statement 8 dis-
tinguishing ainakin (to lend) from amekin (to transfer ownership), this could not 
have happened.
Table 2. Reconstruction of sheep ownership between Brothers Nanam and Mogira.
Pedigree of sheep Owner of sheep’s pedigrees in two research periods1988 1991
A, B Nanam Mogira
C, D Mogira Nanam
A, B, C, and D are different pedigrees of sheep.
III. Improvisation for Reconstructing Livestock Ownership: Nanam’s Marriage
The key to this conundrum lies in the fact that Nanam married his first wife 
around May of 1989. In Turkana society, much livestock ownership switches in 
becoming bridewealth. For Nanam’s marriage, ten cattle, five camels, five don-
keys, and 188 head of goats and sheep were transferred to the bride’s family. In 
the accompanying rituals, just over a dozen goats and sheep were slaughtered, so 
that the brothers lost more than a total of 200 head of goats and sheep for the 
occasion. The animals accounted for about two thirds of goats and sheep owned 
by the brothers. Mogira who was single at that time contributed the half.
The number of livestock to be transferred as bridewealth is decided over many 
days of negotiations between the two groups in a marriage. The father of the bride 
would demand much livestock, while the family of the groom does the best to 
decrease the number. At the same time, the groom’s family members discuss the 
logistics of rounding up the necessary head of livestock (Ohta 2007). I could not 
be present when the brothers Nanam and Mogira discussed Nanam’s bridewealth, 
but the negotiation in choosing each head of livestock must have been a difficult 
task.
Since the Turkana have minute memory of the pedigrees of all the livestock 
they own, the brothers must have recounted every detail in choosing livestock for 
bridewealth. I assume that the brothers reconstructed some pedigrees’ ownership 
in the process, resulting in the inconsistent conundrum in Table 2. In fact, Mogira 
told me the undermentioned in 1991 about the pedigree-C of sheep in Table 2, 
which had been reported as his in 1988. He said that, “The founder sheep was 
originally gained in the exchange using a he-goat that used to belong to me, but 
Nanam had identified as his partner animal. This being so, when he married, I 
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gave all the sheep of pedigree-C to Nanam that reproduced from the founder sheep 
which had been once returned to me.”
In close inspection, before Nanam’s marriage, Mogira had slaughtered one sheep 
for his own ailment-curing ritual from the pedigree-C that he said in 1991 he had 
given to his brother at his wedding. This pedigree was clearly his up to the time 
of Nanam’s wedding. To recapitulate, in helping Nanam prepare enough livestock 
for his wedding, Mogira gave up an entire pedigree descended from the returned 
animal.
Paying bridewealth is fraught with risks because the amount of livestock one 
owns dramatically decreases. The brothers Nanam and Mogira would have impro-
vised livestock ownership against this potentially disastrous situation. All the 
founder sheep of the pedigrees in Table 2 were gained by exchanges with he-goats 
originally belonging to Mogira, but were given to Nanam as partner animals of 
identification. In transferring the ownership of sheep pedigrees in Table 2, the fact 
that the he-goats that Nanam identified with originally belonged to Mogira was 
given priority to reconstruct the pedigrees of A and B. Conversely, in case of 
pedigrees C and D, the fact that Nanam identified with his partner he-goats was 
given priority, and these pedigrees were transferred to Nanam. Had the brothers 
applied Turkana Statement 8 strictly, this improvisation was not possible. This 
illustrates how the Turkana may go back in history to “correctly” dispense with 
the livestock.
CONCLUSION
I have described how the Turkana create and reconstruct facts for themselves 
and try to persuade the others of their own legitimacy, which is their style of 
negotiation. But it does not follow that they are utilitarians who only pursue ego-
tistic interests. The Turkana try hard to reach agreements on specific matters, and 
for them to accomplish this, negotiation is paramount. The brothers Nanam and 
Mogira did not simply protect each other’s interest by exchanging four pedigrees 
of sheep. What they achieved through the process of reconstructing livestock own-
ership was to redefine their mutual social relationship. This was of their utmost 
interest, and they were ultimately successful.
However, social relationships may fray in the face of crisis situations. I have 
seen some cases where emotional discord swelled among family members, to the 
point that the family eventually dissolved. One such dissolution of the family was 
directly because two female family members demanded to be the legitimate owner 
of a pedigree of goats that had come to the family more than ten years before. 
There were many discussions as to the original animal and pedigree, and much 
negotiations ensued. The Turkana people remember the minute and detailed his-
tory of each and every livestock. However, facts and perceptions do not always 
match among the concerned people. In this family’s case, the interested parties 
mobilized and referred to various rules and facts that were true, and no party 
yielded.
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In the East African pastoralist societies, livestock are owned by individuals, but 
in reality, numerous people have numerous entitlements to each of the livestock. 
This has been already pointed out by many anthropologists. Baxter (1975: 212) 
wrote that each livestock animal bore “a bundle of rights,” and Gulliver (1951: 
89), who studied the same Turkana society as I, pointed out that in order to under-
stand Turkana property relations, livestock ownership must be understood as “a 
cluster of rights” of various levels and various types.
However useful the above analytical tools may seem, to apply them to under-
stand the Turkana leads us to believe that a cluster or bundle of rights exists as 
a real entity. But clarifying the categories of individuals and the kinds of entitle-
ments that they hold, will not help to fully understand the property relations of 
livestock. There is more risk in missing the reality of how dynamic the Turkana 
livestock ownership and entitlements are in daily life.
When the Turkana people deal with entitlement issues, they are relentless in 
the negotiation. The interested parties all have backgrounds of similar negotiations 
in the past. They are never shy to go head-to-head as individuals fully loaded 
with demands. For the Turkana, these negotiations about livestock entitlement 
always are expressed as specific and unique cases. Rules and facts are readily 
offered as “pieces-in-hand” in the negotiations to defend one’s own legitimacy, 
but they carefully choose their “piece-in-hand,” and never use them all at once. 
The choice will be decided by the mutual interactions of parties that are in nego-
tiation. Through this process, some sort of conclusion will be meted out, but the 
outcome is always unpredictable to the persons concerned. In other words, “a 
cluster or bundle of rights” does not exist. It only becomes a reality as it emerges 
performatively in the process of negotiation that the Turkana repeatedly engage in 
regarding livestock.
Giddens (1976) criticized the view of Durkheim and Parsons who asserted that 
social norms were external to the individuals. He opposed the argument that attrib-
uted the individual’s subjective actions to their “internalization of values,” and 
claimed, rather, that human actions actively constructed social life. In negotiating 
livestock entitlements, the Turkana may refer to various norms and rules. How-
ever, these rules are not to be applied mechanically. Just as facts may not be the 
same to everybody, the rules are always reinterpreted and put to practice. In this 
sense, the rules and norms do not restrict the individuals as an external factor.
In the beginning of this article, I wrote of a “helpless ambiguity” in the nego-
tiations of things with the Turkana villagers, as if I did not know if things really 
belonged to anybody. Such a feeling of ambiguity must have arisen from my 
naiveté, in that I sought to find a mode of action that is replicable and standard-
ized, faced with the constant Turkana give-and-take of things. Much energy is 
required in settling individual issues in all kinds of individual negotiations. I 
probably had wanted to be liberated from the burden of constant, individual nego-
tiations, and had wanted to set up for myself a standardized pattern of action. 




(1)  Austin (1962) argued that any human statement was an “action,” and termed it “performa-
tive utterance.” He also examined the fact that an utterance had “illocutionary forces.” 
However, I use the term, “performatively,” to emphasize that the specific “bundle of 
rights” emerges only in a process of specific interactions at a specific time and place, so 
that this “bundle of rights” is temporal, and the Turkana do not much trust it. For further 
reference, see Bourdieu’s argument of theory of practice (Bourdieu, 1990) and Butler’s 
theory of performativity (Butler, 1990).
(2)  The etymology of akib is unknown.
(3)  Storas (1991) recorded very interesting cases of livestock negotiations of the 
Turkana.
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